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I Introduction 
 
Violence against women, present in every society in the world, is deeply embedded in South 
Africa’s past and is a central feature of the post-democratic society. The South African 
Constitution is path-breaking in acknowledging this reality by providing a right to be free 
from violence in public and private realms. Over the past two decades since democracy, 
advocacy groups have been successful in lobbying and working with government to secure 
new legislation in the areas of domestic violence and rape. Implementation of these laws has, 
however, been mixed or poor and recourse to the law is limited for many, if not most, victims 
of this violence. A number of significant decisions have emerged from the Constitutional 
Court in relation to these laws and regarding aspects of the common law relevant to violence 
against women. This chapter surveys the jurisprudence on violence against women in 
assessing the Court’s record in this area. While finding these decisions valuable in advancing 
the constitutional framework, the chapter suggests that fuller interpretation of the 
Constitution and more creative litigation and jurisprudence is necessary in contributing to the 
removal of the scourge of violence against South Africa’s women.  
 
Violence against women in South Africa is embedded in a history of brutality that has been 
central to the making of the country.1 Many of the acts of colonial dispossession, invasion, 
war, slavery and apartheid, as well as resistance to end this domination, have entailed 
                                                     
 Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Technology Sydney; Visiting Fellow, Australian Human 
Rights Centre, Faculty of Law, University of New South Wales; Honorary Senior Research Fellow, School of 
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1 Patriarchy, race and class have been intimately connected in shaping the oppressive forms in which gender 
relations have played out in this country. For the classic article that developed this argument, see B. Bozzolli 
‘Marxism, feminism and South African studies’ (1983) 9(2) Journal of Southern African Studies 139–171.  
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violence to the bodies of women.2 While most of the historical articulations of the wars 
against black South Africans are behind us, the war against women and girls lives on in the 
everyday occurrence of domestic violence, femicide, rape, sexual abuse, harassment and 
harmful cultural practices such as ukuthwala (abduction of girls for marriage)3 and attacks on 
people labelled witches.4 Reported rape numbers in South Africa were the highest in the 
world in 2001.5 Recent figures showed 43,195 cases of rape for the year 2014/15 although 
service providers estimate that as little as one in 13 rapes are reported.6 Rape takes a 
particularly brutal form in South Africa with a high rate of rape homicide and multiple 
perpetrator rape being very common.7 In a recent Constitutional Court decision Khampepe J 
noted that:8  
Rape is perhaps the most horrific and dehumanising violation that a person can live through 
and is a crime that not only violates the mind and body of a complainant, but also one that 
vexes the soul. This crime is an inescapable and seemingly ever-present reality and scourge 
on the nation and the collective conscience of the people of South Africa. 
The levels of female homicide as a whole are extremely high and domestic violence, though 
not adequately captured in official statistics, is epidemic.9 South Africa has the dubious 
honour of being known as the ‘rape capital of the world’; as having a deputy president (now 
president) stand trial for rape of the daughter of his friend;10 as having sporting hero Oscar 
Pistorius convicted of murdering his partner; and as the place where so called ‘corrective 
rape’ of lesbians occurs.11 Many other high-profile cases are reported of horrific abuse of 
women and girls.  While violence against women is a global problem it has a local character 
                                                     
2 For a discussion of the history of rape and its various forms in South Africa, see Pumla Dineo Gqola, Rape – A 
South African Nightmare (Johannesburg: MFBooks, 2015). 
3 South African Law Reform Commission, ‘The practice of Ukuthwala’ (Revised Discussion Paper 138, Project 
138, 2015). 
4 Both women and men are targeted: South African Law Reform Commission  ‘The review of The Witchcraft 
Suppression Act 3 of 1957’ (Discussion Paper 139, Project 135, 2014) (Review of Witchcraft legislation). 
5 D. Smythe, Rape Unresolved: Policing Sexual Offences in South Africa (Cape Town: University of Cape 
Town Press, 2015). 
6 AfricaCheck , Factsheet: South Africa’s 2014/15 assault and sexual crime statistics (2016) (available at 
https://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-south-africas-201415-assault-and-sexual-crime-
statistics/#sthash.zuK16lgd.dpufhttps://africacheck.org/factsheets/factsheet-south-africas-201415-assault-and-
sexual-crime-statistics/). 
7 Smythe, Rape Unresolved (n. 5) at p. 17. 
8 Ndlovu v The State [2017] ZACC 19, at 53.  
9 L. Vetten, ‘Deserving and undeserving women: a case study of South African policy and legislation addressing 
domestic violence’ MA thesis, University of the Witwatersrand (2013) p. 5. 
10 Although Jacob Zuma was acquitted of rape, his views and behaviour, as they emerged from the trial, 
represented a troubling understanding of sex and power in a leader of the country. For a discussion of the 
politics of the Zuma trial see, S. Hassim, ‘Democracy’s shadows: sexual rights and gender politics in the rape 
trial of Jacob Zuma’ (2009) 68(1) African Studies 57–77.  
11 L. Mwambene and M. Wheal, ‘Realisation or oversight of a constitutional mandate? Corrective rape of black 
African lesbians in South Africa’ (2015) 15 African Human Rights Law Journal 58–88. 
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in South Africa that is shaped by the country’s history and closely connected to the many 
social, economic and political challenges facing it today.12  
 
Undoubtedly, legacies of structural violence live on for black and poor South Africans, 
regardless of gender, working on the mines, farms and factories and for those living in 
impoverished rural areas or urban settlements and slums, often separated from families and 
communities. Lack of health services, adequate nutrition and reliance on dangerous transport 
continue to determine the length of a person’s life based on their race and class. Service 
delivery protests, workplace violence starkly displayed in the Marikana massacre, 
xenophobic bloodshed, and everyday brutal crime shape the South African reality. While this 
violent backdrop gives context to, and perhaps partly explains, the levels of violence against 
women13 it does not diminish the enormity of this issue – it is neither dramatic nor imprecise 
to characterize this violence as a war against women.14  
 
It is clear that while violence against women is prevalent across social classes, the 
combination of poverty shaped by race has a fundamental impact on women’s vulnerability 
to violence (and related to this, also to HIV infection). Lack of access to income and 
employment deepens women’s dependency on men and limits their capacity to leave violent 
partners. Limited access to housing and social security also make escape impossible for 
many. Inadequate health care and social services mean that responses to violence often fall 
short of what is needed. Poor basic services such as transport, sanitation, water and electricity 
expose women to risks of attack in urban and rural environments. Similarly, girls face daily 
dangers in walking to school, at school where toilets may be some distance from classrooms 
or absent entirely, and where predatory teachers often behave with impunity. Certain groups 
facing additional challenges, such as women with disabilities, lesbians, elderly women, and 
                                                     
12 This violent context is the product of the way in which masculinity and femininity is culturally defined and 
gender inequality is produced. It should be noted at the outset that gender-based violence also affects men and 
boys although women and girls are its major victims. This chapter chooses to use the term violence against 
women rather than more gender neutral terminology to keep the focus on the imbalance between men and 
women that reflects the underlying patriarchal roots of this violence.. 
13 For a discussion of the causes of violence against women in South Africa today see, L. du Toit ‘Shifting 
meanings of postconflict sexual violence in South Africa’ (2014) 40(1) Signs 101–123. 
14 C. A. MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 2006), has noted that: ‘Men violently dominating other men for control of states is 
called war; men violently dominating women within states is relegated to peace’: p. 5. But note the concerns 
with this approach to sexual violence and the state: R. Kapur, ‘Gender, sovereignty and the rise of a sexual 
security regime in international law and postcolonial India’ (2013) 14(2) Melbourne Journal of International 
Law 317–342.  
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women refugees and migrants, have greater exposure to abuse because of their intersectional 
disadvantage.15  
 
This challenging context raises questions about how the country should respond with the 
necessary urgency in marshalling the resources to end this war. It also raises questions about 
the role of the Constitution in informing the boundaries and shape of the law as part of such a 
response. While some feminist scholars are sceptical about rights and laws in tackling 
violence against women, others suggest that law should be one, albeit limited, part of the 
approach to this challenging issue.16 Law is seen by the latter as a contested arena that must 
be engaged with in the context of the broader project of ending sexual oppression and 
gendered power imbalances. Women’s groups were central to efforts to include strong gender 
equality rights and protections against violence in the South African Constitution. This text 
has since been used to inform legislative development of rape and domestic violence laws 
and to defend and improve such laws through the courts. The Constitutional Court has been a 
focus of litigation on issues of violence against women and has produced sensitive and 
progressive jurisprudence in this area.  
 
This chapter will briefly discuss the history and nature of the constitutional text as it pertains 
to violence against women (Part II) before looking, also briefly, at the key legislative 
developments in the areas of domestic violence and rape (Part III) over the past 20 years. 
Thereafter, it will survey the decisions of the Constitutional Court that dealt with this 
legislation as well as a series of decisions that dealt with the common law in cases where 
women were victims of male violence (Part IV).  It will evaluate these decisions in terms of 
criteria set out in Part IV. The chapter will argue (Part V) that a fuller interpretation of the 
Constitution and more creative litigation and jurisprudence is necessary in addressing 
violence against women, in particular through the use of social and economic rights.  
 
This chapter is a domestic rather than comparative evaluation of the South African 
constitutional project that assesses the Court’s performance within South Africa’s specific 
                                                     
15 As noted at n.11, gender-based violence affects other vulnerable groups such as boys and gay men. 
16 In the latter category, in the South African context see, C. Albertyn et al, ‘Women’s freedom and security of 
the person’ in E. Bonthuys and C. Albertyn (eds.) Gender, Law and Justice (Cape Town: Juta, 2007) 295. In the 
US context see the foundational article by E. Schneider, ‘The dialectic of rights and politics: perspectives from 
the women's movement’ (1986) 61 New York University Law Review, 589–652. For a discussion of human 
rights as a contested space in responding to violence against women, see S. E. Merry, Human Rights and 
Gender Violence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 
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historical and current context, and considers the unrealized opportunities that the 
constitutional text presents for those working to end violence against women. The chapter, 
nevertheless, provides insight for comparative scholars considering the value of different 
constitutional articulations of human rights and how these support (or fail to support) efforts 
to address violence against women. It also provides a view of the jurisprudential 
opportunities and pitfalls in this area that may be applicable elsewhere. Gender equality, and 
central to this, the right of women to live lives free of violence, is a precondition for full 
democratic participation17 and is a universal goal.18 The South African experience contributes 
to a wider understanding of the possibilities and limits of constitutions in challenging the 
ubiquity of violence against women.   
 
II The Constitutional text  
 
The involvement of women as a lobby group in shaping the content of South Africa’s new 
Constitution focused on ensuring that gender equality was strongly protected.19 There was no 
specific acknowledgement of rights for women facing violence in and outside of the home in 
the Interim Constitution 1993. However, with input from the women’s lobby,20 feminist 
parliamentarians and technical experts involved in the drafting of the Final Constitution 1996 
succeeded in including the words ‘to be free from all forms of violence from either public or 
private sources’21 in s. 12 of the Bill of Rights which deals with freedom and security of the 
person as well as significant reproductive and sexual rights within the same section. These 
notable additions aligned with and were informed by international developments of the same 
period. In 1994, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the 
                                                     
17 See, e.g., N. Fraser, Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the "Postsocialist" Condition (New York: 
Routledge, 1997); M.  Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
18 United Nations, Sustainable Development Goals, Goal Five. 
19 C. Albertyn, ‘Women and the transition to democracy in South Africa’ (1994) Acta Juridica 39–63. 
20 C. Albertyn (ed.), Engendering the Political Agenda: A South African Case Study (Johannesburg: University 
of Witwatersrand, Centre for Applied Legal Studies, 1999), pp. 120–121, 66–68. 
21 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s. 12(1)(c). The whole section reads as follows:  
Section 12 Freedom and security of the person 
(1)Everyone has the right to freedom and security of the person, which includes the right - 
a. not to be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause; 
b. not to be detained without trial; 
c. to be free from all forms of violence from either public or private sources; 
d. not to be tortured in any way; and 
e. not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. 
(2) Everyone has the right to bodily and psychological integrity, which includes the right - 
a. to make decisions concerning reproduction; 
b. to security in and control over their body; and 
c. not to be subjected to medical or scientific experiments without their informed consent. 
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Elimination of Violence Against Women22 and in the same year the Cairo Programme of 
Action articulated women’s reproductive rights at the International Conference on Population 
and Development.23 Both of these statements on women’s rights reflected a shift towards 
recognising women’s agency over their bodies and required the breaking down of some of the 
harmful public/private divisions in law that had rendered violence against women invisible.24 
The international law has been specifically referenced by the Constitutional Court in some of 
the key decisions on violence against women.25  
 
The inclusion of freedom and security and bodily integrity rights was part of a broader 
constitutional commitment to non-sexism26 as evidenced by the strong equality right which 
includes sex, gender, pregnancy and marital status as grounds of unfair discrimination.27  The 
anti-discrimination legislation, mandated by the Constitutional equality right, prohibits unfair 
discrimination based on gender which includes gender-based violence and female genital 
mutilation.28 The Act also prohibits harassment based on sex and gender29 and gender-related 
hate speech.30 Its preamble makes reference to patriarchy, alongside colonialism and 
apartheid, as systems that generated inequality and caused pain and suffering to the majority 
of South Africans.31 The Constitution also established a Commission for Gender Equality as 
an independent body to promote and protect gender equality.32 The Constitution contains a 
provision regarding the role of the police service in protecting the public.33 
 
                                                     
22 UN GAOR 48th sess., U.N. Doc. A/Res/48/104 (1994). 
23 A/CONF.171/13, Report of the International Conference on Population and Development: Cairo 5-13 
September 1994 (94/10/18) (18 October 1994). 
24 E. Bonthuys and W.  Domingo, ‘Constitutional and international law context’ in E. Bonthuys and C. Albertyn 
(eds.) Gender, Law and Justice (Cape Town: Juta, 2007) 51 pp. 64–8. For a discussion of South Africa’s 
international human rights compliance see: M. Govender, ‘Domestic violence: is South Africa meeting its 
obligations in terms of the Women’s Convention?’ (2003) 19 South African Journal on Human Rights 663-678. 
For a broader discussion of human rights as a response to violence against women see: R. Manjoo ‘Violence 
against women as a barrier to the realisation of human rights and the effective exercise of citizenship’ (2016) 
112 Feminist Review 11–26.  
25 Bothma v Els and Others (2010) 1 BCLR 1 (Constitutional Court), at para. 55-6; S v. Baloyi [2000] 1 BCLR 
86 (Constitutional Court), at para. 13; Masiya v. Director of Public Prosecutions Pretoria (The State) and 
Another [2007] 8 BCLR 827, at para. 37; Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security [2001] 10 BCLR 995 
(Constitutional Court), at para. 62 . 
26 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, preamble, s. 1(b). 
27 Ibid s. 9. 
28 Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 2000, ss. 8(a)–(b). 
29 Ibid s. 1. 
30 Ibid s 2(c). 
31 Ibid preamble. 
32 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996, s. 187. 
33 Ibid s. 205(3). This role is elaborated by O’Regan J in K v. Minister of Safety and Security [2005] 9 BCLR 
835 (Constitutional Court), at para. 52. 
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III Legislative developments 
 
It was this broad and hard-won constitutional framework that informed the development of 
new post-apartheid laws on violence against women. In the first decade of democracy, huge 
effort was expended in creating strong legislative measures to address and respond to 
violence against women. This resulted in the enactment of the Domestic Violence Act34 to 
allow courts to provide protection orders and the Sexual Offences Act which expands the 
definitions of rape and other sexual offences.35 Both pieces of legislation were informed by 
the urgent need to address violence against women and by the constitutional promise of 
freedom and security.   
 
The Domestic Violence Act replaced the Prevention of Family Violence Act36 which was 
hurried through in the last days of the Apartheid Government. The new Act was framed in 
terms of South Africa’s constitutional commitments to freedom and security of the person 
and equality and its international obligations to end violence against women and children. 
The Act contains a broad and progressive definition of domestic violence that includes 
economic abuse, damage to property and controlling or abusive behaviour alongside more 
traditionally recognised forms such as physical abuse and sexual harassment.37  Complainants 
can obtain interim and final protection orders from courts that can include a wide range of 
conditions limiting the respondent’s access to the home or workplace of the complainant and 
requiring the payment of rent and emergency relief.38 The protection order is accompanied by 
a warrant of arrest that can be used if the order is breached and criminal sanctions can be 
imposed on contravention of an order.39 Despite its positive features, the Domestic Violence 
Act has been criticised for its piecemeal approach (it neglects issues of child custody and 
matrimonial property) as well as for focusing on policing and the courts without also 
legislating in areas such as health care, housing and income support.40  
 
The Sexual Offences Act was introduced after a lengthy consideration by the South African 
Law Reform Commission and an extended consultation process that took a decade to produce 
                                                     
34 Domestic Violence Act 1998. 
35 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act  2007. 
36 Prevention of Family Violence Act 1993. 
37 Domestic Violence Act 1998, s. 1. 
38 Ibid s. 7. 
39 Ibid ss. 8, 17. 
40 Vetten, ‘Deserving and undeserving women' (n. 8), p. 43. 
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changes to the law. The Act aimed to bring the out-dated definition of rape and related 
offences in line with the rights in the Constitution. This led to changes in the definition that 
recognised rape could involve penetration into the vagina, anus or mouth of the victim with 
any body part or object.41 It also introduced gender neutrality into the definition of rape by 
recognising that anyone, men included, could be a victim of the crime. The Act expanded on 
sexual crimes against children and people with mental disabilities and introduced laws related 
to trafficking. The Act also provided some rights to victims for post exposure prophylaxis to 
avoid HIV infection and introduced a sexual offences register. While many feminists were 
actively involved in lobbying for the new legislation, some felt despondent about the eventual 
content of the law. Artz and Smythe, commenting shortly before the Sexual Offences Bill 
was enacted, argued that the focus on the constitutional right to equality rather than the right 
to be free from all forms of violence led to law with a ‘peculiarly liberal feminist flavour’.42 
This is particularly evident in the gender neutral definition of rape, taken together with the 
lack of measures to protect victims, that has ‘muted the distinctly gendered experience of 
sexual assault’.43 They suggested that the removal of gendered language has ‘edited out the 
structural reality of gender-based violence’ and the uneven gender power relations between 
men and women.44 Artz and Smythe were also critical of the failure to remove ‘consent’ from 
the definition of rape. They were particularly concerned with the relegation of measures to 
protect victims in the criminal justice system to the policy framework of government rather 
than being located within the Act, as originally intended. Their conclusion was that the 
reform of rape law has been somewhat symbolic but has had some value in terms of public 
education. However, huge challenges remain to shift practices within the justice system and 
the jurisprudence and to improve the experiences of victims. 
 
Both Acts have been accompanied by various policy plans by government to give effect to 
these laws and develop wider responses. Dishearteningly, many commentators have 
bemoaned the poor implementation of these laws and plans in the period since their 
enactment. Dee Smythe has noted in relation to rape laws and policies that:45 
 
                                                     
41 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 2007, s. 1 (definition of sexual 
penetration). 
42 L. Artz and D. Smythe, ‘Feminism vs. the State? A decade of sexual offences law reform in South Africa’ 
(2007) 74 Agenda 6–13 at 10. 
43 Ibid 11. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Smythe, Rape Unresolved (n. 5), at pp. 46–7. 
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South Africa is paper rich when it comes to dealing with sexual violence. It has ratified the 
leading international and regional human rights treaties and instruments seeking to address 
these problems, and enshrined a constitutional protection against privately perpetrated 
violence, applied and enforced through decisions of our highest courts. At a policy level, the 
South African government and the police service have identified violence against women as a 
critical policing priority and enacted institutional safeguards against inappropriate responses 
to rape complainants through National Instructions and Standing Orders. The problem is not 
with the law in the books but with criminal justice practice. It is in the practical realities of 
everyday policing and in the attendant discretionary choices, that police responses to rape 
crumble, reinforcing the pretext that rape is, essentially, a crime that is impervious to 
policing.  
 
There is less despondency about the implementation of the Domestic Violence Act but 
concerns remain about the training of government officials, access to justice for poor women 
as well as the lack of options for women fleeing violence.46 These two laws have been the 
subject of litigation in the Constitutional Court, in some cases leading to their improvement 
and in others defending their provisions. The next Part examines this jurisprudence as well as 
three decisions relating to the interpretation of the common law where the state failed to 
protect women from violent assault and rape. 
 
IV Constitutional court jurisprudence 
 
This Part evaluates the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court over the past 20 years on the 
subject of violence against women.47 While the Supreme Court of Appeal and the provincial 
                                                     
46 H. Combrinck ‘The dark side of the rainbow: violence against women in South Africa after ten years of 
democracy’ (2005) Acta Juridica 171–199; L. Artz and D. Smythe ‘Bridges and barriers: a five year 
retrospective on the Domestic Violence Act’ (2005) Acta Juridica, 200–226; Vetten, ‘Deserving and 
undeserving women’ (n. 8). 
47 The following decisions, in chronological order, are considered here: S v. Baloyi [2000] 1 BCLR 86 
(Constitutional Court); Carmichele v. Minister of Safety and Security [2001] 10 BCLR 995 (Constitutional 
Court); Ex Parte Omar [2003] 10 BCLR 1087 (Constitutional Court); K v. Minister of Safety and Security 
[2005] 9 BCLR 835 (Constitutional Court); Masiya v. Director of Public Prosecutions Pretoria (The State) and 
Another [2007] 8 BCLR 827; Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v. Minister for Justice and 
Constitutional Development and Others [2009] 7 BCLR 637 (Constitutional Court); Bothma v Els and Others 
[2010] 1 BCLR 1 (Constitutional Court); F v. Minister of Safety and Security and Another [2012] 3 BCLR 
244 (Constitutional Court); Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Another v. Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development and Another  [2013] 12 BCLR 1429 (Constitutional Court) (Teddy Bear Clinic); J 
v. National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another [2014] 7 BCLR 764 (Constitutional Court). The case 
of S v. Marais [2010] 12 BCLR 1223 (Constitutional Court), dealing with an appeal by a woman who arranged 
for her husband to be killed will not be included in the discussion. Her unsuccessful appeal concerned her wish 
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High Courts have handed down some very important constitutional judgments on this subject, 
mostly dealing with criminal law and procedure, this broader jurisprudence will not be 
canvassed here.48 The Constitutional Court decisions are evaluated in terms of a number of 
criteria that, as discussed in the introductory chapter to this collection, combine both internal 
and external measures of success. This evaluation considers, first, whether the jurisprudence 
pursues the transformatory mandate inherent in the Constitution in ensuring laws aimed at 
achieving far-reaching social change including substantive gender equality.49 Second, and 
related to this, whether the Court’s decisions infuse the interpretation of the law and the rights 
in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution with the democratic values underlying the 
Constitution of dignity, equality and freedom.50 Third, whether they effectively engage with 
and provide guidance on the legal responses to violence against women and advance the law 
in this area. Fourth, whether they provide a consistent, coherent and convincing jurisprudence 
on violence against women that fairly balances sometimes competing constitutional rights. 
These are narrow criteria, judged qualitatively, that do not attempt to evaluate the possible 
impact that the Constitution or the Court has had on governmental or public responses 
towards violence against women, let alone on the reduction of this violence.51 
 
Before examining the Court’s decisions it is worth noting the factual issues in nine of the 
leading judgments lest the real people involved become lost in the legal discussion.52 The 
following is a brief description, in chronological order, of the types of violence that led to the 
judgments under discussion.  
                                                                                                                                                                     
to bring further evidence of her status as a battered women as a defence against her conviction and sentence. 
The Constitutional Court’s decision is primarily procedural and the substantive issue of the battered woman 
defence had already been decided by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the case of S v. Ferreira and Others 
[2004] 2 SACR 454 (SCA). The decisions in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Another v. 
Minister of Justice and Others [1998] 12 BCLR 1517 and Geldenhuys v. National Director of Public 
Prosecutions and Others [2009] 5 BCLR 435 (Constitutional Court), although concerning definitions of sexual 
offences, are not included here since they do not concern violence against women. Both cases, formal equality 
decisions, related to the unfairly discriminatory criminalization of male to male sexual conduct. 
48 For a discussion of some of these decisions see, Albertyn et al, ‘Women’s freedom’ (n. 15); M. J. Maluleke 
and T. Madonsela, Gender Equality Jurisprudence in Landmark Court Decisions (Department of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, 2009). 
49 See, K. Klare, ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on 
Human Rights 146–188; C. Albertyn and Beth G., ‘Facing the challenge of transformation: difficulties in the 
development of an Indigenous jurisprudence of equality’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 
248–276. 
50 As set out in s. 39(1)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 and informed by ss. 7(1) and 
36(1). 
51 See the discussion of the evaluation of causation in the introductory chapter by Dixon and Roux. 
52 In the Teddy Bear Clinic case there were no individual applicants or respondents as the case was brought 
directly by organizations challenging the constitutionality of laws. 
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The complainant in Baloyi’s case alleged that her husband, an army officer, assaulted her and 
threatened to kill her following the granting of an interdict where he had been ordered not to 
assault her and their child or prevent them from leaving or entering their joint home.53 Alix 
Carmichele was brutally assaulted by Francois Coetzee who had previously been convicted 
of indecent assault of one woman, and attempted rape of a 17-year-old girl. He attacked 
Carmichele with a pick handle and stabbed her with a knife after breaking into the house 
where she was staying. In Omar’s case, the applicant was arrested for breaching a domestic 
violence order in which he had been prohibited from ‘threatening, assaulting, harassing, 
intimidating, stalking or abusing’ his estranged wife and their children. In K’s case a 20-year-
old woman was stranded without transport and was offered a lift by three policemen who 
then assaulted and took turns raping her. Masiya was accused of anal penetration of a nine-
year-old girl. In DPP v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development and others, 
Phaswane was convicted of the rape of a thirteen-year-old girl who was the sister of his 
cohabiting partner. In the same case, Mokoena was convicted of the rape of an eleven-year-
old girl. Bothma’s case concerned a woman who claimed she was repeatedly raped over two 
years from the age of thirteen by a much older family friend. In F’s case, a thirteen-year-old 
girl was given a lift home by a policeman who assaulted and raped her. In the case of J, a 
fourteen-year-old boy was convicted of the rape of a seven-year-old boy and two six-year-old 
boys. He was also convicted of assault for stabbing a twelve-year-old girl.  
 
The facts in the cases that have reached the Constitutional Court reflect the reality of vicious 
crimes against women, girls and boys. Most of the victims were female and many were 
children. Aside from age, other indicators of vulnerability include the lack of access to 
transport, women’s fear for their safety on the streets, and poverty that forced a young girl 
and woman to seek lifts from policemen. A number of the victims were women and children 
who were unable to find safety from violence in their own homes. All of the perpetrators 
were male. 
 
The Constitutional Court’s ten decisions on violence against women broadly concern three 
areas: sexual offences and how the criminal law and procedure treat victims and perpetrators 
of sexual crimes; the constitutionality of domestic violence legislation; and the boundaries of 
                                                     
53 He alleged, although this was version was not accepted, that his wife and her brother had assaulted him.  
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civil liability of the state where it fails to protect victims from physical and sexual harm by 
employees and other offenders.  
 
(a) Sexual offences  
 
The sexual offences judgments deal with one decision that arose before the coming into force 
of the Sexual Offences Act concerning the common law definition of rape; a decision 
concerning the time delay in the prosecution of child abuse; and three decisions arising from 
the reforms to the law after 2007.  
 
Masiya’s case concerned the common law definition of rape which excluded anal penetration 
and was gender specific. The case reached the Court shortly before the long awaited Sexual 
Offences Act created a statutory crime of rape ‘applicable to all forms of sexual penetration 
without consent, irrespective of gender’.54 It is an important judgment in setting out the 
patriarchal history of rape (in both its colonial and customary origins) that saw the crime in 
terms of the interests of male protectors of women rather than in terms of the rights of the 
women themselves; and understanding this history in terms of male dominance and power, 
objectification of women, and gender stereotyping.55 The judgment noted that the new 
Constitution provides a different foundation for the law of rape based on the democratic 
values of the Constitution of human dignity, equality and freedom.56 In particular, the rights 
to freedom from violence, equality and dignity are implicated in relation to this crime.57 The 
Court acknowledged the role of women’s activism in challenging patriarchal notions of rape 
and in ensuring the wide acceptance that ‘sexual violence and rape not only offends the 
privacy and dignity of women but also reflects the unequal power relations between men and 
women in society’.58 This led the Court to extend the definition so as to ‘promote the spirit, 
purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’59 and the ‘principles, ideals and values underlying 
the Constitution’.60 
 
                                                     
54 Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 2007, preamble. See ch. 2, pt. 1, s. 3 
for the definition. 
55 Masiya v. Director of Public Prosecutions Pretoria (The State) and Another [2007] 8 BCLR 827, at para. 24. 
56 Ibid at para. 25. 
57 Ibid at para. 27.  
58 Ibid at para. 28. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid at para. 45. 
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The majority decision of Nkabinde J (followed by eight judges) did, however, refuse to 
extend the definition of rape to non-consensual intercourse between men because in terms of 
the facts of the case this matter was not before the Court. It hinted, however, that law reform 
was needed in this regard.61 This was disputed by Langa CJ in a minority decision (Sachs J 
concurring) where he found that the absence of men in the definition of the crime failed to 
give ‘effect to the constitutional values of dignity, equality and freedom: dignity through 
recognition of a violation; equality through equal recognition of that violation; and freedom 
as rape negates not only dignity, but bodily autonomy’.62 While Nkabinde J highlighted the 
particular vulnerability of women and girls to rape,63 Langa CJ focused on the protection of 
all people, regardless of gender.64 He stressed that this recognition would not detract from the 
understanding that women are the ‘primary target of rape’ and that ‘male domination of 
women is an underlying cause of rape’.65 He went further to argue that limiting rape as a 
crime against women might entrench stereotypes of women as vulnerable, hence reinforcing 
their subordinate position.66 He argued that male rape is as much about ‘gender-supremacy’ 
as female rape and hence, from an equality perspective, requires equal protection.67 Langa CJ 
justified the development of the common law beyond the facts presented in the case on the 
basis that curing the gender defect in the law was a necessary part of the development of the 
crime of rape based on the underlying constitutional principles, as necessitated by the case 
before the Court.68 
 
Langa CJ’s decision is more deeply aligned with a substantive understanding of gender 
inequality since it recognises the concurrence of male and female gender-based harm while 
acknowledging the patriarchal underpinnings of and manifestation of the crime. Ultimately, it 
offers more transformatory possibilities than the minority decision in requiring gender 
equality to include more far-reaching and systemic cultural, social and psychological change 
if sexual violence is to be addressed.69 Commenting on this decision, Bonthuys argued that 
the majority incorrectly focussed on ‘the sex of the victims and perpetrators, rather than on a 
                                                     
61 Ibid at para. 31. 
62 Ibid at para. 80. 
63 Ibid at para. 37. 
64 Ibid at para. 84. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid para. 85. 
67 Ibid  para. 86. 
68 Ibid para. 90. 
69 See also, C. Albertyn, ‘Substantive equality and transformation in South Africa’ (2007) 23 South African 
Journal on Human Rights 253–276. 
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proper understanding of gender’.70 She suggested that the majority’s approach in Masiya 
reflected a similarly conservative approach followed by the Court in the Jordan71 case where 
it failed to acknowledge that the criminalization of the sale of sex but not its purchase was 
unfair gender discrimination.72 The Court appeared to be favouring a safe and narrow 
approach to issues of sexuality where ‘bad’ women and male rape victims do not fit the 
image of the victim requiring protection.73 The Langa CJ judgment, in succinctly capturing 
the implications of rape as a violation of the core values of the Constitution, led to a more 
nuanced and progressive re-interpretation of the common law. 
 
In Bothma’s case the Constitutional Court balanced the accused’s right to a fair trial against 
the interests of a complainant alleging child sexual abuse and society’s need for justice. The 
High Court had permanently stayed a private prosecution by Mrs Bothma who alleged she 
had been raped as a child. It found that she had waited an unreasonable length of time (39 
years) which prejudiced the right to a fair trial of the man she accused. The Constitutional 
Court granted Mrs Bothma’s appeal against the High Court decision on the basis that victims 
of child sexual abuse can take many years to acknowledge, report, and pursue complaints. 
The Court referred to Nkabinde’s strong statements on the crime of rape in the Masiya 
decision and added the context of unequal power arising from age differences that impact on 
the silencing of children who have been sexually abused.74 Sachs J found that:75 
Without pronouncing on the veracity of her charges, it should be noted that there also exist strong 
public policy reasons for allowing the nature of the crime to weigh heavily in favour of allowing 
these charges to be aired in court. Adults who take advantage of their positions of authority over 
children to commit sexual depredations against them, should not be permitted to reinforce their 
sense of entitlement by overlaying it with a sense of impunity. On the contrary, the knowledge 
that one day the secret will out, acts as a major deterrent against sexual abuse of other similarly 
vulnerable children. 
The decision is a further demonstration of the Court’s contextual understanding and firm 
stance on sexual violence. 
 
                                                     
70 E. Bonthuys, ‘Putting gender into the definition of rape or taking it out? Masiya v Director of Public 
Prosecutions (Pretoria) and Others, 2007 (8) BCLR 827 (CC)’ (2008) 16 Feminist Legal Studies 249–260 at 
254. 
71 Jordan v. S [2002] 11 BCLR 1117 (Constitutional Court). 
72 Bonthuys, ‘Putting gender into the definition of rape’ (n. 69), at 258. 
73 Ibid. 
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75 At para. 66. 
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The following cases came to the Court after the enactment of the Sexual Offences Act in 
2007. This Teddy Bear Clinic case was an attempt to correct a defect in the new Act that was 
overly broad in restricting consensual sexual activity between adolescents leading to 
inappropriate and harmful criminalization of children. It was brought by not-for-profit 
organisations working with victims of child abuse. The applicants argued that the Act 
violated the rights of children to dignity, privacy and bodily integrity and was not in their best 
interests.76 They argued that the provisions of the Act would unnecessarily expose children to 
the criminal justice system and would constrain ‘healthy attitudes to sexual behaviour’.77 The 
position taken by the applicants was supported by two amici curiae representing women’s 
interests who argued that girls would be disproportionately affected by the provisions and 
that the provisions resulted in indirect discrimination based on sex.78 Khampepe J, in a 
unanimous decision, found that the provisions impaired the dignity of adolescents by leading 
to stigma and shame with potentially traumatic and harmful consequences.79 Dignity was 
closely linked to privacy and was also negatively impacted by the provisions.80 The 
provisions were not in the best interests of children who should not be held criminally 
responsible for consensual sexual behaviour. Criminalization would drive behaviours 
underground and prevent children from having open discussions with parents.81 The Court 
thus found the provisions to be invalid to the extent of their inconsistency but suspended this 
declaration for 18 months to allow Parliament to rework the statute. During this period of 
suspension, the Court ordered a moratorium on investigations, arrests and prosecutions of 
adolescents and to expunge any convictions or sentences under the Act and remove these 
from the sexual offences register. The Court refused to consider the additional contention of 
the applicants regarding the undesirable absence of a ‘close in age’ defence for 16 and 17 
year olds who engage in sexual conduct with adolescents.   
 
The decision, while not directly following an instance of violence against women, was 
important in addressing a problem with the newly enacted Sexual Offences Act. The Act had 
intruded too far into the realm of consensual sex in attempting to protect children from 
violence by criminalizing normal sexual activity between adolescents. The judgment, in 
                                                     
76 Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and Another v. Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development 
and Another [2013] 12 BCLR 1429 (Constitutional Court) para. 29 (Teddy Bear Clinic). 
77 Ibid para. 28. 
78 Ibid para. 36. 
79 Ibid paras. 52–8. 
80 Ibid paras. 59–64. 
81 Ibid para 89. 
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going against this somewhat conservative sentiment, was more realistic and enlightened with 
regard to sexual behaviour of adolescents. While it hinted that sex education was more 
appropriate than criminalization,82it was careful not to prescribe any particular policy 
response to the State.83 The judgement is disappointing in failing to engage with the value of 
freedom or the right to freedom and security of the person. While it examined issues of 
privacy and dignity in relation to children with some sensitivity, it would have been 
beneficial if it had given greater consideration to the positive dimensions of the rights to 
bodily integrity and freedom and security of the person in line with the Constitutional values.  
 
As with the Teddy Bear Clinic case, J’s case related to the rights of children, in this case 
those of child offenders. Here, there was mandatory inclusion of children convicted of sex 
offences against children or persons with a mental disability on the National Register for Sex 
Offenders.84 The inclusion on the Register meant that listed people were precluded from 
working with, supervising or assuming caring responsibilities for children. The Constitutional 
Court found that the legislation resulted in serious violations of the best interests of children. 
In weighing up whether limitations of the rights of these children were justified, the Court 
acknowledged the competing rights of child offenders and other vulnerable groups to be safe 
from abuse. The Court stressed that:85 
 
Sexual violence threatens a victim’s rights to freedom and security of the person, privacy and 
dignity in a profound way.  Sexual offences have effects that ripple far beyond the horrific 
immediacy and physicality of the crime.  Our success or failure as a community to prevent 
and protect against sexual violence has bearing on us all, collectively and individually. 
(footnotes omitted) 
 
Nevertheless, the Court decided that the limitation of the rights of child offenders was not 
justified as there were less restrictive means to achieve the purpose of the legislation. 
However, the Court was unable to craft an order that would remedy the situation without a 
broader re-examination of the Act as a whole. It therefore declared the section invalid but 
suspended the declaration of invalidity for 15 months to enable the legislature to remedy the 
defect. The Court was mindful of the fact that the Act was already being reconsidered 
                                                     
82 Ibid para. 99. 
83 Ibid para. 100. 
84 In terms of s. 50(2) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 2007 
(Sexual Offences Act). 
85 J v. National Director of Public Prosecutions and Another [2014] 7 BCLR 764, para. 48. 
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following the Teddy Bear Clinic case. It also ordered, as an interim measure, that the 
government provide details of children listed in the Register to the Court to make available to 
organisations assisting offenders. The Court demonstrated flexibility and the capacity to 
provide creative responses in its order in this case, whilst avoiding stepping on the toes of the 
legislature.  
 
In 2015 Parliament made the necessary amendments to the Sexual Offences Act in response to 
both the Teddy Bear Clinic case and J’s case.86 
 
The case of DPP v Minister of Justice involved a somewhat more hands-on response by the 
Constitutional Court. The case involved statutory provisions dealing with the protection of 
child complainants in sexual offences cases. The Court refused to set aside the impugned 
provisions but acknowledged concerns with the administration of justice in regard to child 
complainants in sexual offences cases (as supported by evidence from the amici in the 
matter). One of the concerns was the lack of appointment of intermediaries for child 
complainants. Another was the lack of specialist sexual offences courts and officers to 
prepare child witnesses. Only a small number of regional courts had facilities to permit the 
use of intermediaries and even in those courts equipment was often not working. 
Intermediaries were poorly trained and unable to perform their functions adequately. 
Similarly, interpreters or prosecutors, used because they were easier to obtain than 
intermediaries, were not equipped to deal with child witnesses. Very few prosecutors had 
received appropriate training for these types of cases and magistrates were also lacking in 
specific training. The Court found this state of affairs to be inconsistent with the statutory 
promise of intermediaries or the constitutional promise of the centrality of the child’s best 
interest.87 The Court pointed to the vulnerability of child sexual offences complainants who 
are not parties to criminal proceedings but who do have constitutional rights that must be 
protected. The Court stressed, in relation to poor implementation of the new laws, that:88 
 
Compliance with the Constitution requires not only that laws be enacted to give effect to the 
rights in the Constitution, but also requires that these laws be implemented. Failure to 
implement laws that protect constitutional rights is a violation of the Constitution.  
                                                     
86  Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act Amendment Act 2015. 
87 Director of Public Prosecutions, Transvaal v. Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development and 
Others [2009] 7 BCLR 637, para. 198. 
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The Court also noted that the relevant subsections of the Criminal Procedure Act envisaged 
that the state would ‘commit the necessary resources’ to achieve the objectives of the Act and 
the Constitution. In a supervisory order, the Court called for information as a first step in the 
supervisory process, requiring the Department of Justice to list, within 90 days, the number of 
intermediaries and facilities (CCTV, separate rooms for testimony, one-way mirrors) 
available and needed; and the steps being taken to meet these needs. The Court gave the DPP 
and the amici the opportunity to comment on the information provided by the Minister. It left 
open the possibility that further directions might be needed to ensure supervision of its 
orders. 
 
In following this decision, the Department of Justice provided the information as ordered. 
The Court then directed the Department to provide a further report in response to the 
comments on their first report by the DPP and some of the amici. The second report was 
required to provide information on the huge shortage of intermediaries and the many 
postponements in child rape cases resulting from this; whether the Department was 
considering increasing the rate of pay for intermediaries to ‘an appropriate professional’ 
level; the extent of the problem of malfunctioning equipment and what steps were being 
taken to address this quickly. The Department provided this report and made further 
information available in 2012.89 
 
A 2015 report by the Centre for Child Law, one of the amici in the DPP case, examined the 
extent to which the supervisory order was followed by the Department of Justice five years 
later and whether the situation had improved.90 The report found that while there had been a 
quantitative improvement in the provision of services this was not adequately or consistently 
documented so it was hard to evaluate this provision based on available evidence. It called for 
better and clearer data collection. From a qualitative perspective the report found some 
positive examples of good practice but a lack of consistency and variations in the available 
resources. It called for a ‘set of norms and standards applicable to the provision of acceptable 
court services for child victims and witnesses’.91 In relation specifically to the provision of 
intermediaries, the report found greater use and availability of these service providers, but it 
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recommended the need to revise salaries and move away from contract appointments to 
address the shortage of intermediaries.92  
 
The decision is commendable in taking a firm stand on lack of implementation of statutory 
provisions protecting sexual offence complainants. The Court’s use of its supervisory 
jurisdiction was necessary and important in a context where good legal frameworks were 
failing through poor administration. However, it appears that despite the Court’s role 
implementation remains inadequate. This raises two possibilities: first, that the Court may 
have needed to pursue its remedies more expansively; and second, that lack of resources and 
state capacity may remain challenges that cannot be immediately or easily addressed. The 
latter point suggests the unwelcome possibility that despite a responsive Constitutional Court, 
certain problems may be immune to judicial intervention. 
 
Overall, the five sexual offences cases decided by the Court led to improved substantive and 
procedural law and, to some extent, to better administration of justice.  
 
(b) Domestic violence 
 
In two cases concerning domestic violence, one brought under the old legislation and the 
other under the newer Domestic Violence Act, the Court was strong in its defence of laws 
under attack from men named in court orders.   
  
The case of S v Baloyi concerned the predecessor to the Domestic Violence Act 1998, the 
Prevention of Family Violence Act 1993. It related to whether a provision requiring a person 
charged with breaching a family violence interdict to prove that they were not guilty violated 
their right to be presumed innocent. Sachs J, in a unanimous judgment, found that the 
provision did not introduce a reverse onus and did not violate the rights of the person charged 
with breaching an interdict. The decision is significant in presenting a sophisticated 
argument, informed by feminist theory, for viewing domestic violence laws as different from 
other criminal law in the balancing of the rights of women to be safe from domestic violence 
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against the rights of men accused of such crimes. In interpreting the s. 12 right to be ‘free 
from all forms of violence from either public or private sources’, Sachs J noted that:93 
 
The specific inclusion of private sources emphasises that serious threats to security of the 
person arise from private sources.  Read with section 7(2), section 12(1) has to be understood 
as obliging the state directly to protect the right of everyone to be free from private or 
domestic violence.  Indeed, the state is under a series of constitutional mandates which 
include the obligation to deal with domestic violence: to protect both the rights of everyone to 
enjoy freedom and security of the person and to bodily and psychological integrity, and the 
right to have their dignity respected and protected, as well as the defensive rights of everyone 
not to be subjected to torture in any way and not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman 
or degrading way. (footnotes omitted) 
 
The right to be free from violence has thus been interpreted by the Court as placing a positive 
obligation on the state to protect women from domestic violence.94 The right is read together 
with s. 7(2) of the Constitution which requires the state to ‘respect, protect, promote and fulfil 
the rights in the Bill of Rights’. Sachs J alluded to the distinction in the wording of s. 12 
where the overall rights to freedom and security of the person (s. 12(1)) and to bodily and 
psychological integrity (s. 12(2)) are seen as essential features of personhood to which 
everyone is entitled to receive protection. Most of the sub-sections of ss. 12(1) and (2) 
contain the types of harms that people should not be subjected to – what Sachs J calls 
‘defensive rights’.  Thus, people must expect the state to defend them against such harms 
while protecting their freedom, security and integrity. 
 
Interestingly, Sachs J added the issue of dignity here to his discussion of the right. It is 
unclear whether he was referring to dignity as one of the three central values of the Bill of 
Rights set out in s. 7(1) of the Constitution or dignity as a right articulated in s. 10, or both. It 
seems curious to single out the value of dignity from the list of dignity, equality and freedom 
when freedom is so obviously central to the right in s. 12. Sachs J did, however, go on to 
consider equality when he argued that domestic violence ‘compels constitutional concern’ 
because it is ‘gender-specific’ and a product of a patriarchal society.95 This, he noted, meant 
that ‘the non-sexist society promised in the foundational clauses of the Constitution, and the 
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right to equality and non-discrimination guaranteed by section 9, are undermined when 
spouse-batterers enjoy impunity’.96   
 
Sachs J came to the issue of freedom when considering what autonomy means for women 
facing domestic violence. Drawing on feminist legal theory he noted that both autonomy and 
privacy have been used to shield men and prevent intervention to protect women in the home. 
He thus praised the idea behind domestic violence protection laws which are aimed at 
addressing the complexities of intimate partner abuse without immediate recourse to the 
criminal law. Sachs J pointed to the laudable purpose of protection legislation which ‘at its 
most optimistic … seeks preventive rather than retributive justice, undertaken with a view 
ultimately to promoting restorative justice’.97  The judgment has been rightfully lauded for its 
sensitive but firm elaboration of women’s rights to be protected from domestic violence by 
the state. 
 
Unlike Baloyi the Omar case was brought in terms of the newer Domestic Violence Act of 
1998. It concerned a similar issue of the constitutionality of the provision of the Act that 
allowed a Court, when issuing a protection order, to authorize a warrant of arrest that would 
be suspended unless there was a breach of the protection order.98 The Court stated that:99 
 
The high incidence of domestic violence in our society is utterly unacceptable.  It causes 
severe psychological and social damage.  There is clearly a need for an adequate legal 
response to it.  Whereas women, men and children can be victims of domestic violence, the 
gendered nature and effects of violence and abuse as it mostly occurs in the family, and the 
unequal power relations implicit therein, are obvious.  As disempowered and vulnerable 
members of our society, women and children are most often the victims of domestic violence.  
 
The Court stressed that domestic violence ‘brutally offends the values and rights’ of the 
Constitution.100 Because of the ‘complex public … (and private) character’ of domestic 
violence, measures were needed that differed from the general criminal laws.101 The Court 
examined the workings of the legislation and Omar’s arguments that his rights of access to 
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court and to a fair trial and against arbitrary arrest were affected negatively. It found that 
none of these rights were compromised by the scheme of the Act and, as with Baloyi’s case, 
there was no issue of a reverse onus.102 Since the Court found that none of the rights of a 
respondent in a domestic violence matter were infringed by the Act, it did not need to 
undertake any kind of balancing exercise. The Omar case did not significantly deepen the 
interpretation of the Constitutional framework on domestic violence as developed in Baloyi. 
It did, however, confirm the value and integrity of the Domestic Violence Act as a necessary 
and appropriate means of protecting women and children (primarily) from harm in the home.  
 
Both decisions use the Constitution to defend women’s rights to freedom and security and 
affirm the state’s obligations to protect them. They do not, of course, consider how the 
Constitution might oblige the state to take measures to prevent violence against women from 
arising in the first place or to protect women by ensuring that they have access to the 
resources needed to avoid the violence that emerges in situations where poverty and 
disadvantage leave them defenceless.  
 
(c) State liability under the common law  
 
While the above cases deal with the state’s obligations to protect women from violence in the 
home, the Court has given a series of decisions regarding the state’s obligations to protect 
women from violent men outside of the home under the common law. The three cases of 
Carmichele (2001), K (2005) and F (2012) concern the way in which the Constitution 
informs the interpretation and development of the common law in situations where the state 
fails to protect people from criminal acts. In all three cases, the criminal acts concerned 
violent attacks on women and girls. These cases have proved highly significant, not just to 
the law of delict, but more generally to the understanding of the role of the Constitution in 
reshaping the common law. The Carmichele case dealt with the question of whether the state 
was liable for the conduct of police and prosecutors that led to a member of the public being 
harmed by a criminal who should not have been released on bail. It raised the question, of 
importance to this discussion, of the nature of the state’s obligations to protect women from 
harm.  The K and F cases were more narrowly focused on the vicarious liability of the state 
for victims of violent acts against women by policemen.  
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In a unanimous decision in Carmichele, the Constitutional Court stressed that the courts have 
an obligation to develop the common law having regard to the ‘spirit, purport and objects of 
the Bill of Rights’.103 In determining whether police officers were under a legal duty to act, 
the Court said that the weighing up of the interests of the parties and the community involved 
a proportionality exercise that would need to be considered in the context of a ‘constitutional 
state founded on dignity, equality and freedom and in which the government has positive 
duties to promote and uphold such values’.104 This could entail both a duty not to perform an 
act that violates rights and a positive duty to provide protection.105 This echoes the comments 
of Sachs J in Baloyi regarding the state’s obligations to protect people from domestic 
violence and promote their rights to freedom and security.106 The Constitutional Court found 
that the values underlying the Constitution pointed to the possible extension of liability to the 
state since the state, under the Constitution, has obligations to ‘respect, protect, promote and 
fulfil the rights’, ‘and in particular, the right of women to have their safety and security 
protected’.107  It further noted that for police approaching their positive obligations arising 
from legislation and the Constitution, in relation to the rights to dignity and freedom and 
security of the person, ‘few things can be more important to women than freedom from the 
threat of sexual violence’.108 
 
The Court upheld Carmichele’s appeal and referred the matter back to the trial court to 
conclude the trial and determine the factual and legal issues. The trial court found the 
Minister of Safety and Security was liable and this was confirmed by the Supreme Court of 
Appeal,109 effectively reversing the finding of the same court in an earlier hearing of the case. 
In the intervening period the test for wrongfulness in delict had been developed in light of the 
Constitution in the cases of Van Eeden110 which concerned an escaped repeat rapist and Van 
Duivenboden111 which concerned a man who killed his wife and child and shot a neighbour 
where he should not have been allowed to possess firearms. 
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The Carmichele decision of the Constitutional Court has been broadly applauded for its focus 
on the centrality of the values and rights within the Constitution in shaping the development 
of the common law. In comparing the case with a similar case in the US courts, Roederer 
noted: 112 
 
The contrast is between a court that views its constitution as a progressive covenant between 
the people and its government, which fosters a culture of justification and accountability, and 
a court that views its constitution as a charter of negative liberties, which will go to great 
lengths to conserve the status quo distribution of rights and entitlements. One is intent on 
protecting the vulnerable members of its society, and the other is skeptical of attempts by the 
legislature to do so through the creation of new rights. (footnotes omitted)  
 
Commenting on the later case of K, Roederer argued that it showed, like Carmichele, a 
similar value-based response to state accountability and the obligation to protect vulnerable 
members of society. K’s case concerned the nature and scope of vicarious liability in the 
situation where three policemen, while on duty, raped a young woman to whom they had 
offered a lift home. O’Regan J, in a unanimous decision overturning the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Appeal, found the Minister of Safety and Security liable. The judgment 
developed the vicarious liability rule in line with the ‘spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights’, following the Carmichele requirement that the normative values of the Constitution 
must inform the development of the common law.113  The court recognised that the principle 
of vicarious liability poses difficulties where the delictual act deviates from an employee’s 
normal duties, and is even more difficult where it is an intentional wrong.114 The Court 
explained that the test for vicarious liability115 involves a subjective question of whether the 
wrongful acts were done purely for the benefit of the employee. Even where they were, there 
is still a further objective test of the sufficient closeness of the link between the employee’s 
acts to further his or her own interests and the ‘purpose and business of the employer’.116 This 
part of the test is both factual and legal – the legal component of sufficient closeness requires 
examination in terms of the ‘spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights’.117 In applying 
the redeveloped test to the facts of K’s case the Court found that the policemen, in committing 
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the rape against K, ‘were simultaneously omitting to perform their duties as policemen’.118 
O’Regan J noted that by offering K a lift, the policemen had induced her to trust them, 
something she was entitled to expect from the police in terms of the Constitution. They failed 
to meet their general duty to protect K from harm and their special duty in the particular 
situation of the case. ‘The close connection between the wrongful conduct of the policemen 
and the nature of their employment’ led to the Minister of Police being liable for K’s 
damages.119 The policemen infringed K’s constitutional rights to dignity and security of the 
person. 
 
The decision sent a strong message to the governing bodies of the police that police personnel 
who abuse their positions of power remain the responsibility of the force. In a country where 
women live in fear of sexual violence, it is critical that they must be able to both expect 
protection from the police and feel confident that the police themselves will not abuse their 
authority and take criminal advantage of women.  
 
The final and most recent case in the sequence of cases dealing with the common law in 
relation to liability following violent crimes against women is the case of F. Here, a 13-year- 
old girl was raped and assaulted by a policeman on standby duty who had given her a lift 
home. The case reached the Constitutional Court on appeal from the Supreme Court of 
Appeal (SCA) which had decided not to hold the Minister of Safety and Security liable. The 
majority decision of the SCA distinguished this case from K’s case on the basis that a 
policeman on standby duty was not on duty and hence had not committed a delictual 
omission. It (mis)understood K’s case to mean that an intentional commission such as rape 
could not result in vicarious liability for the state.  
 
The Constitutional Court (Mogoeng J) considered the boundaries of the test for vicarious 
liability as set out in K in the situation where a policeman on standby duty ‘deviates from his 
employer’s constitutional obligation to protect the public and engages in conduct that 
constitutes “the single greatest threat to the self-determination of South African women”, 
                                                     
118 Ibid at para. 48 (emphasis added). 
119 Ibid at para. 57. 
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namely rape’.120 The Court followed the K approach to determining vicarious liability in 
examining the facts of F’s case. It looked at the following factors:121  
 
the state’s constitutional obligations to protect the public; the trust that the public is entitled to 
place in the police; the significance, if any, of the policeman having been off duty and on 
standby duty; the role of the simultaneous act of the policeman’s commission of rape and 
omission to protect the victim; and the existence or otherwise of an intimate link between the 
policeman’s conduct and his employment. 
 
Mogoeng J noted that rape by men of women and girls which is common and ongoing, and 
often goes unpunished, is a violation of a range of women and children’s rights.122 He went 
on to say that:123 
 
The threat of sexual violence to women is indeed as pernicious as sexual violence itself.  It is 
said to go to the very core of the subordination of women in society.   It entrenches patriarchy 
as it imperils the freedom and self-determination of women.  It is deeply sad and unacceptable 
that few of our women or girls dare to venture into public spaces alone, especially when it is 
dark and deserted.  If official crime statistics are anything to go by, incidents of sexual 
violence against women occur with alarming regularity.   This is so despite the fact that our 
Constitution, national legislation, formations of civil society and communities across our 
country have all set their faces firmly against this horrendous invasion and indignity imposed 
on our women and girl-children. 
 
Mogoeng J stressed that courts must accept that common law rules are now subject to 
constitutional values and ‘it is their duty to ensure that the fundamental rights of women and 
girl-children in particular are not made hollow by actual or threatened sexual violence’.124  
 
The Court found that the standby duty status of the policeman did not preclude the state from 
liability as the focus of vicarious liability, following K’s case, was the trust placed by the 
member of the public in the police. It also found that the SCA has misinterpreted the decision 
in K that vicarious liability related not just to omissions of employees but commissions as 
                                                     
120 K v. Minister of Safety and Security [2005] 9 BCLR 835 (Constitutional Court) para. 37. The Court was 
quoting counsel for the Centre for Applied Legal Studies, as cited in Carmichele at para. 62. 
121 Ibid at para. 52. 
122 Ibid at para. 55. 
123 Ibid at para. 56. 
124 Ibid at para. 57. 
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well. It explained that rape by a policeman and his failure to protect the woman are ‘two sides 
of the same coin’ and are ‘inseparable’.125  The Court accepted that the ‘closeness of the 
connection’ between the wrongful conduct of the policeman and his employment was more 
tenuous on the facts of this case than in K’s but that the link was still sufficient to find the 
state vicariously liable. 
 
The three cases clarify and extend the obligations of the state under the common law of delict 
to compensate women who have been harmed by violent men due to the inaction and action 
of state officials, particularly police and prosecutors. It remains to be seen whether the 
common law will be developed further, in light of the Constitution, in requiring state 
responsibility for the protection of women from public and private sources of violence. Dee 
Smythe notes that the ‘full ambit of state obligations to protect, investigate, punish and 
compensate victims of sexual violence has not been fully explored in South African courts’126 
and that ‘the cases have dealt with harm suffered consequent to a failure by the police to 
comply with their obligations, rather than the harm intrinsic in such a failure.’127 This leads to 
a consideration of the way in which the Constitution might be used to greater effect in 
tackling violence against women in the ways that Smythe mentions and in ways that might 
create the conditions for violence to be reduced and prevented. 
 
V Expanding constitutional opportunities to address violence against women 
 
An evaluation of the jurisprudence indicates that the Constitutional Court sees violence 
against women as an extremely serious infringement of human rights that is at odds with the 
values that underlie the Constitution. The Court has shown a willingness to develop the 
common law and require the improvement of statutes where these are failing to appropriately 
tackle this urgent social crisis. The Court has made it clear that the state has obligations in 
terms of the Constitution and international law to protect women from violence.  The cases 
also point to the Court’s preparedness to use its remedial jurisdiction to order remedies that 
require the state to expend resources and take actions to meet its obligations under the law. 
Most of the decisions are contextual in approach and situate legal development within an 
understanding of the extent, nature and impact of violence against women. This ensures that 
                                                     
125 Ibid at para. 72. 
126 Smythe, Rape Unresolved (n. 5) at p. 30. 
127 Ibid p. 224, endnote 117. 
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the decisions avoid conservative, inappropriate or formalistic approaches to law. The 
combination of a progressive Court and a strong constitutional text has resulted in 
jurisprudence and a constitutional model worth emulating elsewhere.128 
 
The judgments discussed demonstrate an engagement with the rights to freedom and security 
of the person alongside dignity and equality as key rights contravened by acts of violence 
against women and children. The values of human dignity, equality and freedom have been 
given prominence in some of the leadings decisions set out above. Compared to some of the 
gender equality jurisprudence that has attracted criticism by feminist scholars,129 the violence 
against women jurisprudence is broadly progressive. However, the ten decisions in the 20 
years of the Constitution have dealt only with the protection of women from harm and their 
treatment within the legal system or in claiming damages once such harm has occurred. No 
case dealing with the obligations of the state to take active measures to prevent violence 
against women has reached the Court, and this leads to a jurisprudential gap that should be 
remedied. It is a concern that a limited range of cases has reached the Court and that there has 
been a lack of opportunity for the Court to deepen its jurisprudence and provide far-reaching 
responses. Advocacy and service organizations representing violence victims have thus far 
played a mostly responsive role in assisting the Court (with the exception of the parties who 
brought the challenge to the provisions criminalizing under-age sexual conduct).130 There 
appear to be opportunities for such groups to creatively formulate new public interest 
litigation that engages the Constitution and the courts more effectively. The lack of litigation 
may reflect a number of things, including despondency within the sector about the value of 
good judgments when implementation remains so poor. Aside from looking to the 
Constitution for opportunities to litigate further in this area, the Constitution should be used 
as a framing document for new policy and law reform initiatives by the sector. 
 
The South African constitutional experience on violence against women reflects some 
important successes but these must be taken further to expand the legal frameworks and the 
                                                     
128 Note however, that although s. 12 was path breaking in referring to public and private violence, constitutional 
provisions on violence against women could be even more explicit and expansive, for example, The 
Constitution of the Tunisian Republic 2014, Art. 46, which says: ‘The state shall take all necessary measures in 
order to eradicate violence against women’. 
129 E. Bonthuys, ‘Institutional openness and resistance to feminist arguments: the example of the South African 
Constitutional Court’ (2008) 20 Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 1–36; C. Albertyn, ‘Law, Gender and 
Inequality in South Africa’ (2011) 39 Oxford Development Studies 139–162. 
130 The Teddy Bear Clinic for Abused Children and RAPCAN in the Teddy Bear Clinic case. 
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state’s obligations in this area. There are real questions about the ability of the Court to 
address lack of state capacity in implementing its laws in the face of massive social and 
economic problems, including the epidemic of violence against women. Clearly, the 
Constitution alone is not sufficient to solve this issue. Nevertheless, it is a text with the 
capacity to contribute further, in tandem with a range of other mechanisms and actors to 
tackle this major challenge.   
 
This last part of the chapter considers some of the constitutional possibilities that could be 
explored to expand the Constitution’s reach in both protecting women from violence and 
responding to it. These include: developing the meaning and content of the right to freedom 
and security of the person in s. 12; deepening the interpretation of the constitutional values 
and considering their substantive content; drawing on the social and economic rights, in 
combination with s. 12 and the right to equality to obtain the necessary resources and action 
by the state in addressing violence that is closely tied to gendered poverty. Other rights such 
as rights to culture and religion may also prove important in challenging practices that lead to 
violence and abuse of women. 
 
Developing the interpretation of s. 12 
The right to freedom and security of the person in s. 12 of the Constitution is capable of 
further interpretation and elaboration by the courts. The positive and negative dimensions of 
the right could be more fully spelt out as a basis for expanding the boundaries of state 
obligations to address violence against women. The various dimensions of the right have 
implications for women facing violence. Thus, deprivation of freedom referred to in s. 
12(1)(a) may result from controlling partners or parents who prevent women and girls from 
working, socialising or participating in their communities, using physical, psychological, 
economic and other forms of control. The idea of freedom from violence from public or 
private sources referred to in s 12(1)(c) may involve some definition with regard to acts of 
abuse by teachers, religious leaders or employers. In the employment context, sexual 
harassment is sanctioned but this does not necessarily mean that employers are taking active 
steps to prevent its occurrence. In situations where people face job insecurity, common in 
high unemployment contexts such as South Africa, the right might need to be used to require 
measures to prevent harassment and abuse of women workers. Similarly, in the schooling 
context where power inequalities, together with poverty, shape girls’ capacity to challenge 
teachers who abuse them, the right should be used to expand the available preventative and 
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responsive measures. Sadly, the references in s. 12 to torture and cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment are relevant to women in South Africa where rape, domestic violence 
and other forms of abuse can be categorised in these terms. Strong statements by the court on 
these definitional overlaps would be important in clarifying the conceptual boundaries of 
violence against women as a violation of human rights.131 Similarly, bodily and psychological 
integrity, the second part of s. 12, has important meaning in the context of violence against 
women, particularly the sub-right of ‘security in and control over their body’. In a country 
where many young people of both sexes believe that non-consensual sex is normal,132 
fulfilling the s. 12 right might entail educational programmes to address these alarming 
perceptions.133 Marius Pieterse discusses the possibilities of using s. 12 to obtain material 
outcomes in the health sphere and points to judicial decisions in South Africa and Canada 
that might support this interpretation. Similar arguments could be applied in the area of 
violence against women.134 
 
Deepening the substantive interpretation and application of the constitutional values 
The values of dignity, equality and freedom underlying the rights in the Bill of Rights require 
ongoing interpretation and development in the context of the particular rights they inform and 
the circumstances of the cases reaching courts. In considering the development of the right to 
equality in its engagement with culture, Albertyn has proposed an interpretation of the 
fundamental constitutional values as follows:135 
 
dignity as affirming the humanity of each person and their entitlement to equal concern and 
respect; equality as remedying of disadvantage and enabling redistribution (difference should 
not be a basis for disadvantage); an affirmation of difference and diversity (positive 
differences should be recognised and developed); and freedom as autonomy, participation and 
the establishment and nurturing of conditions for substantive choice. 
                                                     
131 On the relationship between violence against women and human rights, see Manjoo, ‘Violence against 
women’, (n. 23).  
132 R. Jewkes and N. Abrahams, ‘The epidemiology of rape and sexual coercion in South Africa: an overview’ 
(2002) 55 Social Science and Medicine 1231–1244. 
133 For recommendations of the types of programs to address these attitudes see E. Fulu et al, Why Do Some Men 
Use Violence Against Women and How Can We Prevent It? Quantitative Findings from the United Nations 
Multi-Country Study on Men and Violence in Asia and the Pacific. (UNDP, UNFPA, UN Women and UNV, 
2013).  
134 M. Pieterse,‘The interdependence of rights to health and autonomy in South Africa’ (2008) 125 South 
African Law Journal 553–572. See also, D. Bhana, ‘The substance of contractual autonomy in the twenty-first 
century: the South African experience’ (2015) 48(4) VRÜ Verfassung in Recht und Übersee, 491–515. 
135 C. Albertyn,‘The stubborn persistence of patriarchy’? Gender equality and cultural diversity in South Africa’ 
(2009) 2 Constitutional Court Review 165–208 at 187. 
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She notes that freedom is the least developed constitutional value and, like Pieterse, argues 
for a substantive conception of freedom that enables choice, agency and participation. 
Violence is multi-dimensional in its impact on women, limiting their opportunities, life 
choices, access to resources and to full participation in society. Understanding dignity, 
freedom and equality substantively involves addressing these various dimensions of the 
impact of violence on women. The development of substantive freedom as a fundamental 
value underlying all rights in the context of violence against women is a critical conceptual 
constitutional project that may lead to practical outcomes for victims. For example, if sex 
workers who face regular sexual violence are not provided with the mechanisms to resist 
attack because the employment ‘choices’ they make are frowned upon, then freedom is given 
a meaning that is narrow and unresponsive.136 
 
Drawing on the social and economic rights (together with other rights) 
Scholars examining the Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence on violence against women have 
pointed to the need to look to the social and economic rights in the Constitution to address the 
conditions of poverty that expose women to violence and limit their access to appropriate 
services.137 A study by Elsje Bonthuys has considered the issue of domestic violence in 
particular and the ways in which social and economic rights might be used to overcome the 
implementation deficiencies of the Domestic Violence Act.138 This is innovative research both 
within South Africa and beyond where the links between violence against women and social 
and economic rights have not been fully theorised in constitutional or international human 
rights law. Conceptually, Bonthuys brings together the right to gender equality and socio-
economic rights to focus on the issue of domestic violence against women specifically. She 
draws on work that has combined substantive gender equality with socio-economic rights to 
address the conditions of material disadvantage and status-based discrimination that 
adversely affect women.139  
                                                     
136 See research on the relationship between freedom, access to property and resources, and domestic violence in 
the Indian context: B. Aggarwal and P. Panda, ‘Toward freedom from domestic violence: the neglected obvious’ 
(2007) 8 Journal of Human Development 359–388. 
137 P. Andrews, ‘Learning to love after learning to harm: post-conflict reconstruction, gender equality and 
cultural values’ (2007) 15 Michigan State Journal of International Law 41–62 at 62; Combrinck, ‘The dark side 
of the rainbow’ (n. 45) at 196–8. 
138 E. Bonthuys, ‘Domestic violence and gendered socio-economic rights: an agenda for research and activism’ 
(2014) 30 South African Journal on Human Rights 111–133.  
139 S. Fredman, ‘Engendering social and economic rights’ in B. Goldblatt and K. McLean (eds.) Women’s Social 
and Economic Rights – Developments in South Africa, (Cape Town: Juta, 2011) p. 4. This involves an 
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While Bonthuys’ argument provides a fruitful framing of the issues and the basis for further 
research, litigation and advocacy on domestic violence it leaves certain conceptual and 
substantive questions open for further development. At a conceptual level, the reliance on 
gender equality, together with socio-economic rights, to provide the substantive responses to 
domestic violence against women overlooks the need to theorize the relationship between the 
right to freedom and security of the person and socio-economic rights. The rights in s. 12 
need to be given substantive content based on a rich conception of the value of freedom that 
requires state and private provision of the means to exist as free and autonomous members of 
society. At a substantive level, Bonthuys’ paper only addressed domestic violence and there 
would be value in a similar study that considers the role of social and economic rights in 
addressing other forms of sexual or gender-based violence. Such a study might lead to ideas 
for creative litigation including the installation of lighting in informal settlements to make 
streets safer for women, education programmes in school to address male and female 
attitudes to sex, transport for girls to reach school safely or, as required by the Bombay High 
Court, the provision of women’s toilets in public places that has a positive impact on their 
safety.140 Private provision of services and supports might also be required in terms of social 
and economic rights, for instance, to address violence against women and sexual harassment 
in the workplace.  
 
We know there are problems with state capacity and implementation and that solving these 
problems takes time. Constitutional rights can create the enabling framework for community-
based responses that are less resource-dependent than orders requiring state provision of 
services. An example of this might be a program undertaken by school students, parents and 
teachers to ensure girl students are accompanied to school by protective groups based on a 
roster system. Creative local responses can be defended by courts where they face regulatory 
challenges or can be rolled out to other areas by courts. Such strategies should not, however, 
                                                                                                                                                                     
application of Fredman’s focus on both distributive and status-based features of equality, to violence against 
women. Fredman’s conception of four-dimensional substantive equality includes these recognition and 
redistribution dimensions but also requires a focus on participation and transformative approaches. It would be 
valuable to map all of Fredman’s equality dimensions of socio-economic rights as a response to violence against 
women. It would also be important to think about intersectional discrimination and how violence against women 
has different implications for a variety of different groups such as women with disabilities, lesbians, and women 
in religious communities.  
140 Milun Saryajani v. Pune Municipal Corporation and Others, P. I. L. No. 98 of 2011, H. C. Bom, (23 
December 2015). 
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be seen as transferring state obligations to women and communities, themselves time and 
resource poor.141        
 
VI Conclusion 
 
This chapter, in examining the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court on violence against 
women over the past 20 years, has noted the valuable framework created by the Court in 
defining the state’s obligations in this area. It has argued that this framework requires 
expansion if it is to offer additional space for attempts to use law to challenge systemic and 
ongoing violence. The chapter has made some suggestions for ways in which this 
jurisprudential framework might be developed and where creative litigation might bring new 
issues into focus for the Court. These areas of development would be aided by considering 
comparative and international jurisprudence and might also impact on debates in these 
terrains. It is clear that it is a difficult economic and political context in which to demand 
more from a state whose capacity to implement existing laws and policies is limited. But it is 
always a difficult time for women facing violence or its threat on a daily basis. It is necessary 
to use all available measures to end the war against South Africa’s women and the 
Constitution remains one of the important tools for this task. 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
141 For a discussion of some of the dangers of placing obligations on poor women to address social problems 
that should be fixed by the society as a whole, see S. Chant, ‘The “feminisation of poverty” and the 
“feminisation” of anti-poverty programmes: room for revision?’ (2008) 44 Journal of Development Studies 165–
197; M. Molyneux, ‘Mothers at the service of the new poverty agenda: progresa/oportunidades, Mexico’s 
conditional transfer programme’ (2006) 40 Social Policy & Administration 425–449. 
